SUMMARY This paper discusses a mode for pseudorandom functions (PRFs) based on the hashing mode of Lesamnta-LW and the domain extension called Merkle-Damgård with permutation (MDP). The hashing mode of Lesamnta-LW is a plain Merkle-Damgård iteration of a block cipher with its key size half of its block size. First, a PRF mode is presented which produces multiple independent PRFs with multiple permutations and initialization vectors if the underlying block cipher is a PRP. Then, two applications of the PRF mode are presented. One is a PRF with minimum padding. Here, padding is said to be minimum if the produced message blocks do not include message blocks only with the padded sequence for any non-empty input message. The other is a vector-input PRF using the PRFs with minimum padding.
Introduction

Background
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is one of the most important elements in cryptography. Informally, it is a keyed function indistinguishable from a random function if the key is chosen uniformly at random and kept secret. It is often used as a function for message authentication (MAC function). It is also used for pseudorandom number generation. A PRF is usually constructed using a block cipher or a cryptographic hash function. We are interested in the latter approach.
Continuing advances of pervasive computing have greatly been increasing the demand for security of devices with constrained resources. To answer to such demand, for cryptographic hash functions, the international standard ISO/IEC 29192-5 [22] has been published, which includes three lightweight hash functions: PHOTON [18] , SPON-GENT [15] and Lesamnta-LW [19] .
In the coming IoT era, many "things" will get connected to the internet and we will enjoy the great amount of benefits, while the risk of cyber attacks will be significantly increased. Examples of the fastest evolving IoT systems can be seen in automotive industry and smart factory (Industry 4.0). Recently, for vehicles, remote software update attracts a lot of attention, and therefore, the international standard ITU-T represents concatenation of sequences. ipad = 0x3636 · · · 36 and opad = 0x5c5c · · · 5c.
SG17 [1] referring to ISO/IEC 29192-5 has been published. To ensure security for IoT devices such as electronic control units in a vehicle, cryptographic solutions such as PRFs need to be lightweight in terms of implementation resources, especially for short messages.
HMAC [5] is a widely deployed MAC function constructed from a cryptographic hash function. HMAC is defined with a hash function H as follows:
where K is a secret key, M is an input message, represents concatenation, ⊕ represents bitwise XOR, ipad = 0x3636 · · · 36 and opad = 0x5c5c · · · 5c. It is also depicted in Fig. 1 .
Due to the length extension property of standardized hash functions such as SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 [16] , HMAC invokes the underlying hash function twice. The drawback of this structure is inefficiency for short messages. Such inefficiency may also come from the padding of the underlying hash function based on the Merkle-Damgård strengthening.
Our Contribution
This paper discusses a keyed mode based on the hashing mode of Lesamnta-LW and the MDP domain extension [20] , which is depicted in Fig. 2 . It is first shown that the keyed mode produces multiple independent PRFs with multiple permutations and initialization vectors if the underlying block cipher is a PRP. Then, two applications of the mode are presented. First, a PRF with minimum padding is presented. We say that padding is minimum if the produced message blocks do not include message blocks only with the padded sequence for any non-empty input message.
Copyright © 2018 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers Fig. 2 A keyed mode based on Lesamnta-LW and the MDP domain extension. E is the underlying block cipher, K is a secret key, IV is an initialization vector, and π is a permutation. The input of E from the top is its key input.
Second, a vector-input PRF (vPRF) is constructed using the PRFs with minimum padding. A vPRF is a PRF which takes as input a vector of strings. The presented vPRF is an instantiation of the protected counter sum construction [10] with a variable-input-length PRF based on Lesamnta-LW and MDP.
The basic idea to obtain multiple independent PRFs using the MDP domain extension is from the precedent paper [21] as well as its two applications described above. It is shown that the keyed mode in [21] may produce multiple PRFs if the underlying compression function is a PRF against related-key attacks with respect to the permutations used in the mode. On the other hand, by adjusting the idea in [21] to the hashing mode of Lesamnta-LW, we show that our keyed mode does not require the security against related-key attacks of the underlying block cipher.
Related Work
It is shown that HMAC is a PRF if the compression function of the underlying hash function is a PRF with respect to two keying strategies [3] . In particular, for one of the keying strategies, the compression function is required to be a PRF against related key attacks with respect to ipad and opad.
Yasuda [33] presented a secure HMAC variant without the second key, which is called H 2 -MAC. It is shown to be a PRF on the assumption that the underlying compression function is a PRF even if an adversary is allowed to obtain a piece of information on the secret key.
AMAC [4] is a MAC function using a hash function encapsulated with an unkeyed output function. Typical candidates for the output function are truncation and the mod function. AMAC is more efficient than HMAC especially for short messages. It is shown that AMAC is a PRF if the underlying compression function remains a PRF under leakage of the key by the output function.
Various PRF modes of a compression function are also known. The plain Merkle-Damgård cascade is a PRF against adversaries making prefix-free queries if the underlying compression function is a PRF [6] . In the context of multiproperty preservation [8] , PRF modes such as EMD [8] and MDP [20] are proposed. Yasuda's PRF mode of a compression function in [29] is shown to be a PRF if the underlying compression function is a PRF against a kind of related key attacks. Sandwich construction for an iterated hash function is shown to produce a PRF if the underlying compression function is a PRF with respect to two keying strategies [30] .
PRF modes using keyed compression functions were also proposed. The first proposal was XOR MAC [7] , which was followed by the protected counter sum construction [10] . It is shown that various hashing modes preserve the PRF security of keyed compression functions [9] . Yasuda proposed PRF modes for keyed compression functions with security beyond birthday [31] , [32] , [34] , [35] .
The most related schemes to our proposal are recent keyed sponge constructions [2] , [11] , [12] , [17] and Chaskey [25] . The advantage of our proposal over them is that the PRF property of our proposal requires a weaker security assumption on the underlying primitive. The keyed sponge constructions are shown to be indistinguishable from a uniform random function in the ideal permutation model, that is, on the assumption that the underlying permutation is chosen uniformly at random. Chaskey is also shown to be indistinguishable from a uniform random function in the ideal permutation model. Chaskey-B is shown to be a PRF if the underlying block cipher is a PRP against related key-attacks.
Minimum padding is already common among blockcipher-based MAC functions such as CMAC [27] and PMAC [14] . CMAC, which is based on OMAC (One-key CBC-MAC) [23] , originated from XCBC [13] . The idea to finalize the iteration with multiple permutations is used in the secure CBC-MAC variants GCBC1 and GCBC2 [26] .
Rogaway and Shrimpton [28] introduced the notion of vPRF. They also presented a generic scheme to construct a vPRF from a common PRF taking a single string as input. Minematsu [24] also proposed a vPRF using his universal hash function based on bit rotation.
Organization
Section 2 gives notations and definitions used in the remaining parts of the paper. It is shown in Sect. 3 that the keyed mode based on Lesamnta-LW and MDP may produce multiple independent PRFs with multiple permutations and multiple initialization vectors. Based on the result in Sect. 3, the PRF with minimum padding and the vPRF are presented and their security is confirmed in the manner of provable security in Sect. 4 and Sect. 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
Notations and Definitions
Let Σ = {0, 1}. For any non-negative integer l, Σ l is identified with the set of all Σ -sequences of length l. Σ 0 is the set of the empty sequence ε.
For x ∈ Σ * , the length of x is denoted by |x|. The concatenation of x 1 and x 2 in Σ * is denoted by x 1 x 2 .
The operation of selecting element s from set S uniformly at random is denoted by s ← ← S.
Let F(D, R) denote the set of all functions from D to R. Let P(D) denote the set of all permutations on D. id represents an identity permutation. Let C (κ, n) be the set of all block ciphers with key size κ and block size n. A block cipher in C (κ, n) is called a (κ, n) block cipher.
Let Π ⊂ P (D). We say that Π is pairwise everywhere distinct if, for any pair of distinct permutations π, π ∈ Π , π(x) π (x) for every x ∈ D.
Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
For f : K × D → R, let A be an adversary trying to distinguish f K from a function ρ, where K and ρ are chosen uniformly at random from K and F (D, R), respectively. A is given access to f K or ρ as an oracle and makes adaptive queries in D and obtains the corresponding outputs. The prf-advantage of A against f is defined as
where K ← ← K and ρ ← ← P (D). In these notations, adversary A is regarded as a random variable. f is called a pseudorandom function (permutation), or PRF (PRP) in short, if no efficient adversary A can have any significant prf-advantage (prp-advantage) against f .
The definitions of the prf-and prp-advantage can naturally be extended to adversaries with multiple oracles. The prf-advantage of adversary A with access to m oracles is defined as
can be defined similarly. The following lemma is a paraphrase of Lemma 3.3 in [6] :
Lemma 1 Let A be any adversary against f with access to m oracles. Then, there exists an adversary B against f such that
The run time of B is approximately total of that of A and the time required to compute f to answer to the queries of A. The number of the queries made by B is at most max{q i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, where q i is the number of the queries made by A to its i-th oracle. 
The Hashing Mode of Lesamnta-LW and Its Variant with MDP
The hashing mode of Lesamnta-LW [19] is given in Fig. 3 . It is the plain Merkle-Damgård iteration of a block cipher E in C (n/2, n), where n is a positive even integer. The input of E from the top is its key input. IV 0 IV 1 ∈ Σ n is an initialization vector, where
Now, let us introduce the variant of the hashing mode of Lesamnta-LW with the MDP domain extension [20] . Hereafter, it is assumed that the underlying block cipher E is in C (w, n), where w < n. The MDP variant with a permutation π on Σ n−w is the function J E,π : Σ n × ( Σ w ) + → Σ n , which is defined as follows: Fig. 4 . As it will be seen later, π need not be a cryptographic primitive. Thus, the computational overhead of π can be small.
Multiple PRFs based on Lesamnta-LW
In this section, it is shown that the MDP variant of the Lesamnta-LW hashing mode may produce multiple independent PRFs with a single secret key using multiple permutations and initialization vectors.
Let J E,π
, where K ∈ Σ w , IV ∈ Σ n−w and X ∈ ( Σ w ) + . K is a secret key and IV is an initialization vector. J E,π
Notice that the setting is different from that of PRF for an adversary with multiple oracles in Sect. 2.2. Only a single
The following theorem states that J E, Π V produces multiple independent PRFs with a single key if E is a PRP.
Theorem 1 Let V ⊂ Σ n−w and Π ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ). Suppose that Π ∪ {id} is pairwise everywhere distinct and that π(IV ) π (IV ) for any π, π ∈ Π ∪ {id} and IV, IV ∈ V such that (π, IV ) (π , IV ). Let A be any adversary against J E, Π V running in time at most t and making at mostueries in total. Suppose that each query consists of at most blocks. Then, there exists an adversary B against E such that
B runs in time at most t + O( qT E ), and makes at mostueries. T E is the time required to compute E.
Remark 1 Let t v and t p be integers such that
• Π ∪ {id} is pairwise everywhere distinct, and
Theorem 1 immediately follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 2 Let V ⊂ Σ n−w and Π ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ). Suppose that Π ∪ {id} is pairwise everywhere distinct and that π(IV ) π (IV ) for any π, π ∈ Π ∪ {id} and IV, IV ∈ V such that (π, IV ) (π , IV ). Let A be any adversary against J E, Π V running in time at most t and making at mostueries in total. Suppose that each query consists of at most blocks. Then, there exists an adversary B against E with access to q oracles such that
where X [1,l] = ε if l = 0. We define
The algorithm of an adversary B against E with q oracles is described below. Let (g 1 , . . . , g q ) be the oracles of B. They are either (
1. B selects r from {1, . . . , } uniformly at random.
If r ≥ 2, then B selects functions
, Σ n ) a×d uniformly at random. Actually, B simulatesμ i, j with lazy evaluation.
3. B runs A. Finally, B outputs the output of A.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ q and 1 ≤ x ≤ , let X = X 1 X 2 · · · X x be the k-th query made by A during the execution of A. Suppose that X is a query to the (i, j)-th oracle of A. If x ≥ r, then B makes a query to the idx(k)-th oracle g idx(k) , where idx : {1, . . . , q} → {1, . . . , q} is a function defined below: For the query to the idx(k)-th oracle, B also chooses ν(k) as follows:
The query made by B is (X r π j (ν(k))) if x = r and (X r ν(k)) if x ≥ r + 1. The answer of B to X is
Now, suppose that B is given (E K 1 , . . . , E K q ) as oracles. Then, the answer of B to X is , and
Suppose that B is given oracles ( ρ 1 , . . . , ρ q ). Then, the answer of B to X is
The functions in { ρ 1 (· π(IV )) | π ∈ Π ∪ {id}, IV ∈ V } are independent of each other since π(IV ) π (IV ) for any π, π ∈ Π ∪ {id} and IV, IV ∈ V such that (π, IV ) (π , IV ). If r ≥ 2, then idx(k) is fixed only by (i, X [1,r−1] ) and ν(k) is chosen uniformly at random only when idx(k) = k. In addition, Π ∪ {id} is pairwise everywhere distinct.
Thus, B provides A with the oracle R[r]
E,π j µ i, j ,ξ i , and
There may exist an adversary with the same amounts of resources as B and larger advantage. Let us call it B again.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 3 of [19])
Let A be any adversary with m oracles against E running in time at most t, and making at mostueries. Then, there exists an adversary B against E such that
2 n+1 . B runs in time at most t + O(q T E ) and makes at mostueries, where T E represents the time required to compute E.
PRF with Minimum Padding
Based on the result in the previous section, a PRF mode with minimum padding is proposed and its security is confirmed in this section. Then, the proposed scheme is compared with two PRF modes based on Lesamnta-LW in [19] in terms of efficiency.
The Proposed Scheme
The padding function used in the proposed construction is defined as follows: For any M ∈ Σ * ,
where t is the minimum non-negative integer such that |M | + 1 + t ≡ 0 (mod w). In particular, pad(ε) = 10 w−1 .
For any M, | pad(M )| is the minimum positive multiple of w, which is greater than or equal to |M |. : Σ w × Σ * → Σ n based on Lesamnta-LW and MDP is defined by
is shown to be a PRF if the underlying block cipher E is a PRP.
Theorem 2 Let IV ∈ Σ n−w . Let {π 1 , π 2 } ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ) and suppose that {π 1 , π 2 , id} is pairwise everywhere distinct. Let A be any adversary against L E, {π 1 ,π 2 } IV running in time at most t and making at mostueries in total. Suppose that the length of each query is at most w. Then, there exists an adversary B against E such that
Proof LetÂ be an adversary against
A simply runs A. Let M be a query made by A. If |M | > 0 and |M | ≡ 0 (mod w), thenÂ returns h 1 (pad(M)) to A. Otherwise,Â returns h 2 (pad(M)) to A. Finally,Â outputs the output of A. The run time ofÂ is almost equal to that of A and A makes at mostueries in total.
Notice that
where ρ ← ← F ( Σ * , Σ n ). Thus, from Theorem 1, there exists an adversary B against F such that
B runs in time at most t + O( qT E ), and makes at mostueries.
Remark 2 A PRF with minimum padding can also be constructed with a single permutation and two distinct initialization vectors. However, L E, {π 1 ,π 2 } IV is much better than this construction. For the PRF with a single permutation and two distinct initialization vectors, users have to know the length of an input message in advance since it determines which initialization vector should be chosen.
Discussion
In [19] , the authors presented two PRF modes based on Lesamnta-LW, which are called a keyed-via-IV (KIV) mode and a key-prefix (KP) mode.
Let n = 256 and w = 128 for J E,π , as is specified for Lesamnta-LW. Let pad L is the padding function of Lesamnta-LW and IV L ∈ Σ 256 is the initialization vector of Lesamnta-LW. Let chop : Σ 256 → Σ 128 be the function which simply outputs the latter half of the input. Then, the KIV mode of Lesamnta-LW is chop(J E,π (K, pad L (M))) and the KP mode is chop(J E,π (IV L , pad L (K M))), where K ∈ Σ 256 and K ∈ Σ 128 are secret keys and M ∈ Σ * is a message input of length at most 2 64 − 1.
For X ∈ Σ * such that |X | ≤ 2 64 − 1, pad L (X ) = X 10 t+63 len 64 (X ), where len 64 (X ) is the 64-bit binary representation of |X | and t is the minimum non-negative integer such that |X | + t ≡ 0 (mod 128).
Suppose that input M is not the empty sequence. Then, the number of invocations of E is |M |/128 + 1 for the KIV mode, |M |/128 + 2 for the KP mode, and |M |/128 for the proposed mode L
is the most efficient, especially for short messages.
The advantage of the KP mode is that it uses the hash function Lesamnta-LW as it is.
The output of L
is twice as long as those of the KIV mode and the KP mode. It may be advantageous when used for pseudorandom bit generation.
Vector-Input PRF
The Proposed Scheme
A scheme is proposed to construct a vector-input PRF (vPRF) using instances of the PRF presented in Sect. 4. In the original formalization [28] , a vPRF accepts vectors with any number of components as inputs. In contrast, the proposed scheme has a parameter which specifies the maximum number of the components in an input vector.
Let a be a positive integer, which is the maximum number of the components in an input vector. Let Π = {π 1 , π 2 } ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ) and V = {IV 0 , IV 1 , . . . , IV a } ⊂ Σ n−w . The proposed vector-input function based on Lesamnta-LW vL
It is shown that vL
Theorem 3 Let V = {IV 0 , IV 1 , . . . , IV a } ⊂ Σ n−w . Let {π 1 , π 2 } ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ) and suppose that {π 1 , π 2 , id} is pairwise everywhere distinct. Let A be any adversary against vL
running in time at most t and making at mostueries. Suppose that the length of each vector component in queries is at most w and the total number of the vector components in all of the queries is at most σ. Then, there exists an adversary B against E such that
B runs in time at most t + O( (σ + q)T E ), and makes at most (σ + q) queries. T E is the time required to compute E.
Theorem 3 directly follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Lemma 4 Let V = {IV 0 , IV 1 , . . . , IV a } ⊂ Σ n−w . Let {π 1 , π 2 } ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ) and suppose that {π 1 , π 2 , id} is pairwise everywhere distinct. Let A be any adversary against vL E, {π 1 ,π 2 } V running in time at most t and making at mostueries. Suppose that the length of each vector component in queries is at most w and the total number of the vector components in all of the queries is at most σ. Then, there exists an adversary B against L
B runs in time at most t and makes at most (σ + q) queries in total. The length of each query is at most w.
Proof Notice that
where
For the first term of the upper bound of Eq. (1), let B be an adversary against L (g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g a ) be the oracles given to B, which are either
The run time of B approximately equals that of A. The number of queries made by B to its oracles is at most (σ + q) and the length of each query is at most w.
For the second term of the upper bound of Eq. (1), let R be the oracle of A such that 1. Prior to the interaction with A,
2. During the interaction with A, return Z i to the i-th query made by A.
As long as bad = 0, R is also identical to Q ρ 0 ,...,ρ a . Notice that
Lemma 5 Let V = {IV 0 , IV 1 , . . . , IV a } ⊂ Σ n−w . Let {π 1 , π 2 } ⊂ P ( Σ n−w ) and suppose that {π 1 , π 2 , id} is pairwise everywhere distinct. Let A be any adversary against L
0 ≤ i ≤ a running in time at most t and making at mostueries in total. Suppose that the length of each query is at most w. Then, there exists an adversary B against E such that
B runs in time at most t + O( qT E ), and makes at mostueries. T E is the time required to compute E. + 1) oracles (h 0,1 , h 0,2 , h 1,1 , h 1,2 , . . . , h a,1 , h a,2 (ρ 0,1 ,ρ 0,2 ,ρ 1,1 , . . . ,ρ a,1 ,ρ a,2 ) ← ← F (( Σ w ) + , Σ n ) 2(a+1) .
Proof
A simply runs A. Let M be a query made by A to its i-th oracle for 0 ≤ i ≤ a. If |M | > 0 and |M | ≡ 0 (mod w), thenÂ returns h i,1 (pad(M)) to A. Otherwise,Â returns h i,2 (pad(M)) to A. Finally,Â outputs the output of A. The run time ofÂ is almost equal to that of A andÂ makes at mostueries in total.
Notice that . B runs in time at most t + O( qT E ), and makes at mostueries.
Discussion
Some generic constructions of vPRF using any string-input PRF such as S2V [28] and S2V-R [24] can also be applied to L E, {π 1 ,π 2 } IV . S2V and S2V-R require finite field multiplications and bit rotations, respectively, as well as bitwise XOR operations. On the other hand, vL E, {π 1 ,π 2 } V only requires bitwise XOR operations if the permutations π 1 and π 2 are bitwise XOR operations with constants. vL E, {π 1 ,π 2 } V can be regarded as an instantiation of the protected counter sum construction with a variable-input-length PRF. It is not a straightforward application, however, in that vL E, {π 1 ,π 2 } V does not require any encoding of an input to add counter values. The domain separation and the ordering of vector components are achieved by the initialization vectors in V.
Conclusion
This paper has first presented a PRF mode based on Lesamnta-LW and MDP which may produce multiple independent PRFs with a single key and multiple permutations and initialization vectors. Then, it has used this mode to construct a PRF with minimum padding and a vector-input PRF. It is expected that the proposed PRF mode will find some other applications. Future work is to provide security analysis for the proposed schemes in multi-user settings.
